《权力》是一本由史蒂文·卢克斯著作，江苏人民出版社出版的197图书，本书定价：20.00元，页数：2008年4月，特精心从网络上整理的一些读者的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。
《权力》精选点评：
●【权力，即是，心理动能的凝聚角动量】-我的这一观点， 不是从这本书中找出的，但却是在当初阅读这本书时产生的。
●权力的三个维度
●新译本，批判的权力观
●不易读，不过我认为作为研究权力的开端读物实在不错。顺说推荐理由是译者是我们老师所以看过就知道我三年里学的其中一部分咯。。。。。。。。。。。。(???)
●祭奠脑细胞
●三种维度的权力梳理，很详实
●捍卫三维权力观which集中于：决策制定和政治议程控制、显明的与潜在的议题、明显或隐蔽的可察与潜伏的冲突、主观的与真正的利益。（29）指出福柯的权力观不断反复重申扩展和无节制夸大“权力既是压制性的同时又是生产性的”，（85）由知识谱系学发展到治理术的时候已经消解为关于社会化的诸种常识。（97）感到既然权力“是那些根深蒂固地依赖于价值的概念之一”，（30）个么脱离比较整齐全活的一般价值和行动理论的话，可能不大容易弄出整齐全活的权力理论来。
●感觉是在不停地玩文字游戏，去质疑评价准则，然后死循环（。
●power的发展 适合政治学入门
●好书，但是吉登斯点出了它的命门：“行动与结构之间的二元论……正因为如此，他既不能令人满意地处理结构在权力关系中的含意，也不能令人满意地处理权力关系在结构中的含意”。
《权力》读后感(一)：对权力观的区分
一维权力：
涉及到（在关于某种议题的决策制定中）对行为的关注（议题存在着可观察的主观的利益冲突），被看作是表达各种政策偏好并且可以通过政治参与方式显示出来。二维权力：
对一维权力观以行为为中心的有保留的批评，并且考虑到了预先防止那些决策接纳各种潜在议题（包含着表达政策偏好和亚政治的愤恨中的主观利益冲突）的方式三维权力：
思想控制通过信息管理、大众传媒与各种社会化的过程中采取了许多比较分散和更加寻常的方式涉及到对前面两种过于个人主义的以行为为中心的观点的彻底批评，同时也对各种潜在的议题被排除在政治活动之外的诸多方式进行了考虑。区分图《权力》读后感(二)：讨论权力，就是参与政治
西闪/文
只要人类社会继续存在，围绕“权力”一词展开的讨论就不会停止——“参与权力的争论本身就是参与政治生活”，对史蒂文?卢克斯的这一观点，我深表赞同。在《权力：一种激进的观点》（以下简称《权力》）中，卢克斯对权力这一“本质上可争论的概念”进行了跨度约30年的理论考察，就如何理解权力以及如何研究权力，提出了自己的看法。
30年前，卢克斯提出了所谓“三维权力观”，以区别于行为主义的一维权力观和整体主义的两维权力观。他将自己的权力观描述为“一种激进的观念”。30年后，当他的观念继续引起人们争论与批评的兴趣时，他不加改动地重版了三维权力观的原文，并在其后增添了两章全新的内容，于是有了《权力》一书。相较于30年前卢克斯激进的观念，我对他新增的两章内容更感兴趣。
权力概念本身是否清晰决定着人们对权力的研究是否有效。也许就像卢克斯所说，如何界定权力以及如何理解权力取决于如何想象权力——福柯那种“到处都是受害者”（齐泽克语）的权力观或许在修辞学意义上相当有魅力，却可能将人们钉在现实的地面上无法动弹；而类似C?赖特?米尔斯的权力观在“如何统治”的问题上目光专注，对权力的实际状况却缺乏想像力。
过度想像的权力观是行为主义的，卢克斯将其称为“一维权力观”。像福柯一样，持此种权力观的学者认为权力广泛分布于政治体系中，呈现出多元态势，只有“通过一系列对具体决策的审慎的考察”（罗伯特?达尔语），权力才能够被分析。而事实上在具体分析过程中，这些学者难免会将权力等同于影响力，从而导致分析的细碎化和缺乏洞察力。
卢克斯将缺少想像力的权力观称为“两维权力观”。我认为这种权力观是整体主义的，信奉谢茨施耐德的名言：“所有政治组织形式都倾向于发展某些冲突而压制另一些冲突，因为组织本身就是对某种倾向性的动员。”这类学者强调权力的组织化、系统化形态。在卢克斯看来，相较于一维权力观，两维权力观无疑有明显的进步。起码，它不再简单地将权力与影响力划上等号，而是有系统地区分强制力、影响力、权威、武力和操纵等不同类型的权力。但这两种权力观有一点是共同的，它们都强调“冲突”的可观察性。至于缺乏冲突的情况下权力如何运作，他们一致同意把这种问题交给哲学家，因为那已超越了政治分析家的范围。
也就在这一点上卢克斯颇为敏锐地抓住了两种权力观的缺憾，并在二者基础上引入另一个关键词“利益”，希望通过行为、结构、利益这三种维度来更加精确地研究权力。但在30年前，卢克斯对自己的权力观的阐述存在着明显的缺陷。这一缺陷恰恰是因为“利益”与“权力”一样是一个“本质上可争论的概念”，它如果不确定，则权力观不确定。不过在读完《权力》的第一章时，我已隐约感觉布尔迪厄的场域论可能对解决这个问题有帮助。
在《权力》的后两章里，卢克斯的确向场域论靠拢了，这让他能够灵活地使用马克思主义的“虚假意识与真实利益”的概念，从而理直气壮地捍卫他的三维权力观。
在特别精彩的后半部分，卢克斯实际上为读者呈现了权力概念的简明地图。在这张地图上，他除了为自己做了标识，也竞争性地标识了葛兰西、福柯、布尔迪厄、斯科特等人的权力观。这些观念相互竞争，同时也相互渗透，而支配与服从、权力与反抗，是理解这些观念，也是理解现实政治的关键所在。
在批判詹姆斯?斯科特的《统治与抵抗的艺术》时，卢克斯引用了埃塞俄比亚的一句谚语：“当伟大的统治者经过的时候，明智的农民会深深地鞠躬并且默默地放屁。”是理性？是无奈？是讥讽？如何理解其中的含义，也许《权力》一书有助于人们塑造自己的权力观。
《权力》读后感(三)：支配的权力与内在的反抗
在西方学者对权力概念的诠释中，可以粗略看到两种类型分野。一种以马克思·韦伯和赖特·米尔斯为代表，将权力视为个人或集团在不顾他人反对的情况下实现其意志的可能性，在此背后的预设是排他性的利益冲突。另一种则以塔尔科特·帕森斯、汉娜·阿伦特为代表，他们都强调权力的集体性权威与合法性，权力必须在集体的一致同意下才得以成立并行动。
蒂文·卢克斯在《权力：一种激进的观点》一书中归纳的一维权力观和二维权力观，均是沿袭了前一种学术脉络。多元主义代表学者罗伯特·达尔运用行为主义研究方法，考察了社会行动者在关键议题决策上的冲突与竞争结果，给出了“A 拥有支配B的权力在某种程度上就是他能够使B去做某些B否则不会去做的事情”的定义；巴卡拉克与巴拉兹则在批判达尔的基础上提出，权力不仅仅体现在决策制定的过程中，同时也反映在限制决策制定的范围上，亦即进行议程设置，排斥和压制某些行动者的诉求，隐蔽的冲突通过被支配者的心怀怨恨表现出来。
卢克斯批判了两者以个人决策行为的立论基础，他认为，“控制政治议程和排除各种潜在议题的权力不可能得到充分的分析，除非它被看作为一种关于集体力量和社会安排的角色”，A支配B的权力，除了通过让B做他不想做的事情，还可以通过影响、塑造或确定B的真实需要的方式来实现。这种塑造各种信仰、偏好与愿望的权力，是一种隐藏的最不明显的权力形式，事实上提前预防了冲突的发生，因而也是最有效的。这种冲突是“潜伏的冲突”，“它存在于那些运用权力者的利益与那些被他们排斥的人的真正利益之间的矛盾中。”
在卢克斯看来，一、二、三维权力观分别以自由主义、改良主义和激进主义的利益概念为先决条件，任何权力观都依赖于某种规范的特定的利益概念。将权力的本质归为利益，不可能回避价值判断，因此他提出，权力是一个“本质上争议的概念”。
在此，权力的概念是不对称的权力，指涉的是作为“能力”的权力（power to）的亚概念“统治……的权力”（power over），通过类似操纵等形式获得他人的同意和顺从。卢克斯的理论深受葛兰西、卢卡奇等马克思主义者的意识形态理论启发，所谓被支配者的“真实利益”与“虚假意识”联系在一起。而何谓“真实利益”，存在诸多利益的差异性互动和冲突，取决于人们的解释目的、结构与方法，完全仰赖经验性分析。
在马克思主义者看来，透过意识形态生产的控制，统治阶级能够主宰一套前后一致的信念的建立……主导的意识形态渗透、侵蚀了工人阶级的意识，因为工人阶级通过统治阶级的概念范畴来理解现实、体验现实。统治意识形态的功能，就是将工人阶级吸纳进体系，而这个体系的运作实际上与劳动者的物质利益是相背离的。而这种吸纳，也解释了资本主义社会的凝聚和整合。正是在这个意义上，葛兰西认为，对资本主义的反抗会必然消亡。
福柯的权力理论更为极端：规训制造的服从关系无处不在，完全不存在任何脱离权力的解放。权力在各个方向上的弥散，上升到“话语政治”层面，反抗就被剥夺了对象。在这一点上，卢克斯要乐观得多。他高度认同并引用了米尔斯的话，“对掌握权力的人提出要求并使他们对行动的特定结果负责在社会学上是现实主义的，在道德上是公正的，并且在政治上是必需的。”
当他问出“为什么需要权力的概念”时，他似乎暗示，权力的运用隐含着被支配者本可以进行不同的行动（“自愿的服从和不自愿的服从并不完全排斥”），“社会生活只能被恰当地理解为一种权力与结构之间的相互作用，一种对于其本质既是能动性的又是结构性的行动者而言在给定的限度内作出选择和实施策略的可能性网络。”
《权力》读后感(四)：A Critical Review on Power: a Radical View (作者melonsea，系一海外留学生)
此文为笔者留学期间的课业论文，系关于本书的一篇书评。由于卤煮懒，尚未翻译。PRV无疑十分经典，但其主要的问题在于，Lukes为了构建其第三维的权力观，在引用了“虚假意识（false consciousness）”概念的同时，依然对行动者的自主意识（autonomy）恋恋不舍，最终导致了错乱的本体论(ontology)和认识论（epistemology），并进一步致使Lukes混淆了分析（analysis）与批判（critique）、结构（structure）与行动者（agency）之间的关系。虽然如此，单从此书所激发无数讨论这点来看，它无疑是所有学习政治学者的必读之书。
1. Introduction
As such a short book, Power: a Radical View is, undoubtedly, influential and, most importantly, classic. By crediting it as classic, I by no mean consider the arguments in the book totally robust or plausible; rather, what is considered to be highly contestable and problematic is likely more conspicuous than its achievements. But just because of the attention drew by both of its considerable strengths and weaknesses, great deals of lessons have been learned by students and scholars through the debates it provoked.
In terms of Lukes’ main argument, his account of the third dimensional power refers to the power that shapes people preference and cognition of their interests. Power not only changes how people do, but also how people think. Stepping into the realm of preference-shaping power, Lukes inevitably draws on the notion of ‘real interests’, arguing that people’s preference might well be the product of the powerful system which works against their own interest (Lukes 1974 p.38). This notion, however, irredeemably opens the paradox of false consciousness (Rosen 1996), becoming a lightning rod of criticisms from numerous scholars. Having considered the existence of ‘real interests’, Lukes furthers his inquiries upon the question that whether power can be exercised in one’s ‘real interests’, and thus advances a ‘radical view’ that power can be exercised in one’s ‘real interest’.
There are also some other arguments in the books, including the basis on which the process of power can be identified on the three dimensional view of power, the relation between power and responsibility, and individual’s capacity to be autonomous, but since they are mostly derived from, and based on the notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’, I will concentrate most of my attention upon the book’s strengths and weaknesses with reference to the notion of ‘real interest’ and ‘false consciousness’, as well as the criticisms on his radical view.
I suggest that the notion of ‘real interest’ and ‘false consciousness’ is indeed problematic, because it entails the irreconcilable tension between ontology and epistemology in Lukes three-dimensional power, resulting in the confusion of structure and agency, as well as the conflation of two mutually exclusive notions --- analysis of power and critique of power (Hay 2002). Also, Lukes’ radical view is indeed somewhat condescending, and might be used, as an excuse to normalise paternalism, even tyranny. However, in my perspective, its problem is not the paternalism; rather, the problem is that it is not enough paternalist, or in Lukes’s term, radical. The problems and inconsistencies of PRV notwithstanding, since it indeed enormously expands our scope of political studies and heuristically enlightens our thinking, it should not be undervalued and should still be considered a must-read for every scholar and student of power politics.
2. the Notion of ‘Real Interests’ and ‘False Consciousness’
Lukes criticises the one-dimensional and two-dimensional power advanced by Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1970) respectively as ‘too individualistic and allows for consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics (Lukes 1974 p.28)’. In order to expand the definition of power to include preference-shaping, he was made to make the assumption that people have ‘real interests’ and are misled by their ‘false consciousness’.
This assumption, however, results in the most essentially problematic inconsistency in Lukes’ three-dimensional power. Specifically, to assume that people have ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’ is to acknowledge the objectivity of interests, which will necessarily make one embrace a fundamentalist ontology that assumes there is something ‘out there’ independent of our knowledge of it (Furlong and Marsh 2010). However, in the attempt to identify the unobservable, the three-dimensional view is required to abandon a positivist epistemology that preclude the possibility to make knowledge claim based on the unobservable social phenomenon. So accordingly, what inevitably follows appears to be that Lukes must accept a realist, strictly speaking, a Marxist position, which could enable him to acquire the ground to define ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’, of which the standard will necessarily be recourse to some external observers’ points of view (Clegg 1989), or otherwise, the tension between its ontology and epistemology would remain unresolved. Claiming the subject’s credit to judge her ‘real interests’ seems to an alternative, but actually, as Clegg (1989) insightfully points out, ‘ this settles nothing in the issue, because the issue is precisely whether, how and in what way people may know what their real interests are’ (p.117). However, crediting the external observer as the arbiter to judge the subject’s interests is a much unwelcomed notion that is considered to be politically offensive by many.
In fact, numerous commentators, including Benton (1981), Hay (1997) and other scholars critise Lukes’ notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’ as pejorative and politically offensive to individual’s capacity of self-determination, ‘implying a vantage-point for the enlightened academic’ (Hay 2002 p.179) as well as giving ‘paternalist license for tyranny’ (Clegg 1989 p.103). But ironically, the fact is precisely the opposite ---- it is precisely Lukes’ unwillingness to endorse paternalism and claim credit to the external observer that causes the essential problem in his notion of three-dimensional power.
recisely speaking, Lukes not only appears to be ambivalent towards the idea of paternalism, he even argues that agent has a relative autonomy even under domination. Lukes states this point very clearly: ‘… although the agents operate within structurally determined limits, they none the less have a certain relative autonomy… (Lukes 1974 p.57)’. Consequently, the identification of ‘real interests’ involves a Kantian moral-relativism, which is grounded on existential conceptions without any concrete empirical evidence.
However, with the assumption of ‘real interests’ that require external observers to be the judge, it results in what Benton identifies as a ‘paradox of emancipation’: ‘If the autonomy of subordinate groups (classes) is to be respected then emancipation is out of the question; whereas if emancipation is to be brought about, it cannot be self-emancipation’ (Benton 1981 p.162). In other words, Lukes uses a fundamentalist ontology to define interests as objective, and nonetheless, attempts to identify real interests with an anti-fundamentalist epistemology, incurring an essentially inconsistency in his three-dimensional power.
Having been strongly criticised in terms of his inconsistent ontology and epistemology, however, Lukes still does not want to abandon his notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’ and thus defends it in his two essays in the second edition of PRV-- ‘Power, Freedom, and Reason’ and ‘Three Dimensional Power’. He contends that it is a plausible answer to conceive of interests as ‘constitutive of well-being’, in which interests are given by the content of leading a worthwhile life, and which is not straightforwardly preference-dependent (Lukes 2005 p.81), so that it can be concluded that one’s preferences may not necessarily and directly represent one’s real interests. While acknowledging the subjectivity of interests (2005 p.109), Lukes still insists that power can be deployed to block or impair its subject’s capacity to use reason correctly (2005 p.115), so what is said by someone to be her real interests could well be a product of irrational thinking. Keith Dowding (1996, 2006), speaking in defense of Lukes’ notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’, argues that value system could be broken into belief and desire by introducing Dennett’s notion of intentional stance (Dennett 1987), and it follows that people may be led by a false belief to make action that result in a situation in which this belief is no longer desirable. Also, people may have adoptive consciousness to make the best of a bad job which can be exemplified in the scenario in Prisoners’ Dilemma (Elster 1983). In other words, people can still make actions which are not in favour of their real interests, even if they are free from power.
However, since the essential problem is whether interests should be evaluated as subjective or objective, be it ‘straightforwardly preference-dependent’ or not, as long as the agent’s subjectivity is still acknowledged in Lukes framework by which power and interests could be evaluated, these alternatives are of no avail at all in resolving the essentially contestable tension in Lukes’ three-dimensional power, that is, the tension ‘between his evaluative theorization of the interests implicit in action and the absence of any coherent theoretical framework by which these interests might be evaluated’ (Clegg 1989 p.118).
To sum up, the crux of problem in three-dimensional power is not the notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’ itself. Rather, it is the way how Lukes applies it in his theory: Lukes defines interests as objective, yet refuses to analyse power and interests in an objectivist way, rendering the very theoretical framework by which power and interests can be identified and appraised inapplicable.
3. The Confusion of Structure and Agency
The confusion of structure and agency is yet another problem that derives from the ontological and epistemological inconsistency in three-dimension power. As Hay (2002) points out, the divergent opinions of the debate on structure and agency is actually rooted in different ontological perspectives. Accordingly, claiming primacy upon structure will reveal one’s fundamentalist ontological position; claiming primacy upon agency will reveal one’s anti-fundamentalist ontological position, and vise visa.
It could be argued that Lukes’ model adopts a dialectical view that put more weight on human agent rather than a voluntarist view. To identify the process or mechanism of an alleged exercise of power on the three-dimensional view, as Lukes (1974) proposes, one has to be aware of that power may be exercised unconsciously or collectively (p.52). These two difficulties, if not answered appropriately, could easily be attributed to the causation of social structure. In response, Lukes argues that though ‘agents operate within structurally determined limits, they none the less have a certain relative autonomy and could have acted differently’ (p.54), so the key lies in the relation between power and responsibility (p.57). It follows that power and structure are not mutually exclusive in Lukes sense. But in fact, Lukes does not make it clear in his book ‘where structural determinism ends and structural constraint begins (Layder 1985 p.139), so how Lukes posits the relation between structure and agency remains substantially ambiguous.
Actually, in PRV, Lukes also asks himself this unanswered question: ‘when can social causation characterised as an exercise of power, or, more precisely , how and where is the line to be drawn between structural determination, on one hand, and on exercise of power, on the other？’ (1974 p.54). Accordingly, his answer is that to locate power is to fixed responsibility for consequences held to flow from action and inaction of agents. And since the exercise of power, in Lukes’ sense, can be located to agents, the question that he asked himself, arguably, can be translated into ‘when can structure be reducible into agency’. Implicitly, such question pre-assumes that structure could be reducible into agency, therefore in Lukes model, his primacy is actually, implicitly placed upon agency with the reduction of structure, which turns out to be an agency-focused model.
All in all, in terms of the issue of structure and agency, what is problematic about Lukes’ three-dimensional view is that, on one hand, with the absence of a clear demarcation between structure and agency, it becomes so elusive that it can hardly be defined as dialectical; on the other hand, it is arguably too agency-reducible and could be seen as a potential or implicit voluntarism. As a matter of fact, many scholars argued that Lukes is actually more agency-focused than dialectical (Clegg 1979; Layder 1985; Barbalet 1987).
4. The Conflation of Analysis and Critique
Another problem arises is that, in terms of how one should study the process of power and interests, Lukes conflates the notions of analysis and critique, the former of which is dependent upon an objective, and sometimes a scientific, ontological basis, the latter of which is essentially normative and entangled with subjective value-judgment.
ecifically, as mentioned above, if we were to agree on the notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’, we necessarily have to conceive of real interests as objective and something ‘out there’ independent of our knowledge. So in order to identify one’s real interests, we are required to use analytical tools and methodology to examine the objective factors involved, such as one’s physical, psychological, and economical conditions etc., which will unavoidably preclude normative inquiries. In other words, because of the fundamentalist ontological position on which the notion of ‘real interests’ is grounded, the only appropriate questions are delimited to be ‘what exactly are people’s real interests？’ (Parsons 2007).
However, Lukes cannot resist the temptation of engaging into critique, arguing that the significance of power can be identified by the extent to which B could have thought or acted different with absence of A’s domination (Lukes 1974 p.44). This prima facie plausible assumption is actually very inconsistent with the notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’. Accordingly, in response to the pluralist objection that ‘how can one study, let alone explain, what does not happen？’ (Lukes 1974 p.40), Lukes argues ‘where there is no observable conflicts, we must provide other, indirect, grounds for asserting that if A had not acted in a certain way, then B would have thought and acted differently from the way he does actually think and act’ (1974 p.44). In other words, in Lukes case, the way to identify real interests is to look at the extent to which one could have thought and acted differently when one is no longer dominated by any form of power. Just as Colin Hay points out, since ‘to engage in critique is not to apply a scientific principle or analytical technique but to compare real practices to idealised (often utopian) alternative’ (Hay 2002 p.183), we can be sure that the way that Lukes provides to identify ‘real interests’ is typically a form of critique, which is based on an anti-fundamentalist position, critically asking the question of ‘what and how one’s real interests should be ？’, with reference to an anarchic utopia where one is free from power.
Consequently, the ontological inconsistency is considerably apparent in Lukes’ argument in terms of how one should study power and interests: how could one discern a subject’s objective real interests that based on a fundamentalist ontology, by engaging into an anti-fundamentalist-based critique？ As Hay (2002) criticises, Lukes ‘smuggles the normative and ethical foundations for his critical theory into his analysis of power’ (p.183).This conflation, as a result, would lead to one’s frustration when one conducts analysis with Lukes theory.
5. Case Analysis Conducted with Lukes Three-Dimensional Power
The frustration mentioned above notwithstanding, John Gaventa (1982), in his book Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley, explicitly applies Lukes’ three-dimensional power theory in his analysis of the quiescence and rebellion in an Appalachian Valley. In the valley, due to the exploitation of the mining company and huge corruption of the miners’ union, inequalities between the mining company and miners were egregiously evident. So apparently, a reform of the miners’ union would be potentially favourable to most of the miners’ interests. Yet, though miners were in an ‘open system’ and free to take action against the company and the union for their interests, consent to the status quo, rather than support for reform, was ubiquitous.
In order to explain the question of ‘Why did the miners of District 19 oppose the potentially favourable reforms and reformers within the organsation’, Gaventa draws on the three-dimensional approach, arguing that the ubiquitous consent was originated from a sense of powerlessness, which internalised the loyalty of the miners. Consequently, ‘with no perception of cogent reasons to support one memberof the union elite over another, but with plenty of knowledge of the possible costs of defying the established regime it was simply safer for the miners of District 19 to go along with the incumbents’ (p.194). Moreover, myths were developed from the bottom up in the community by the information provided by the power hierarchy of the union, deepening the idea that the safety brought about by obedience would do much more benefit than reform. In other words, the powerful successfully secured the compliance of the powerless through controlling of information, making them susceptible to myths, and thus created a situation where a overwhelming sense of fatalism was developed and there was no alternative but to obey.
Gevanta’s work is empirically valuable, but it illuminates the third dimensional power in more of a ethnographical perspective which depicts the process of power generation that embeds in everyday life experience, rather than in Lukes original model that lays emphasis upon the notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’ (Clegg 1989). In other words, in Gevanta’s case, the objectivity of ‘real interests’ of the powerless is actually dissolved with an anti-fundamentalist epistemology through in-depth ethnology and historic-analysis, which, perhaps unintentionally, deproblematises the ontological and epistemological inconsistency of Lukes’ model.
Many other scholars also argue that to reserve the consistency of the three-dimensional power, the notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’ must be either dispensed with or totally endorsed. Colin Hay (2002) brings forward the redefinition of power, arguing that by redefining power as ‘context-shaping’ and ‘conduct-shaping’, a dialectical model can be formulated, with the notion of ‘real interests’ being dissolved (Hay 2002 p.184). Clegg (1989) also suggests that only Marxist structuralism, which defines ‘real interests’ as ‘class interests’ and ‘false consciousness’ as distorted by ‘dominant ideology’, turns out to be the best alternative to Lukes’ three-dimensional power.
6. Conclusion
Lukes’ three-dimensional power is grounded on the highly contestable notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’, it entails an insurmountable tension between a fundamentalist ontology on which interests are defined as objective, and an anti-fundamentalist epistemology with which interests are to be identified and evaluated normatively. Furthermore, the three-dimensional power model is also problematic in terms of the confusion of structure and agency and conflation of analysis and critique, both of which are derived from the essential inconsistency of its ontology and epistemology. As a result, scholars, including Hay (2002) and Clegg (1989), contend that the notion of ‘real interests’ and ‘false consciousness’ should be dissolved, otherwise it would remain fundamentally inconsistent. Despite of its insuperable problems, numerous lessons have been learned in the discussion of three-dimensional power, and it is indeed edifying and enormously enlarges our intellectual exploration on power. In this sense, because of the illumination and inspirations provoked by Lukes’ three-dimensional power, the value of PRV should never be understated. In fact, PRV will, for a long time, remain a classic literature in the field of politics.
7. Bibliography
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